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Abstract
We study the relation between formal incentives and social ex-
change in organizations where employees work for several managers
and reciprocate to a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this
end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral haz-
ard. We show that when effort is contractible and attention is not,
the first-best can be achieved through bonus pay for both managers
and employees. When neither effort nor attention are contractible, an
‘attention race’ arises, as each manager tries to sway the employee’s
effort his way. While this may result in too much social exchange, the
attention race may also be a blessing because it alleviates managers’
moral-hazard problem in attention provision. Lastly, we derive the
implications of these contract imperfections for optimal organizational
design.
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1 Introduction
Managers in organizations often use common human resources. For example,
they share secretary services, the IT unit, and the personnel department.
People who provide these supporting roles typically face financial incentives,
be they explicit or implicit. However, most of us have the experience that
social interaction to establish a good ‘working relation’ really helps to get
your computer fixed in time, to speed up formalities in last-minute hiring, or
to crucially improve the lay-out of your document in Powerpoint. Although
(obviously) we are nice people, niceness is sometimes also used strategically
to trigger reciprocal feelings in others to get things done.
Such social exchange in organizations has been studied extensively in
the organizational sociology and management literature, where worker reci-
procity in response to managerial or organizational support is a common
theme (see, e.g., Baron and Kreps 1999, chapter 5). The economic litera-
ture on manager-subordinate reciprocity has so far mainly focussed on how
generous financial compensation is interpreted as ‘kindness’ by the employer,
triggering effort and loyalty in the employment relation (Akerlof 1982, Fehr
and Gächter 2000). Relatively little has been written in economics about
social interactions between managers and workers in firms.
This paper develops an economic model of social exchange within firms.
Our aim is to get more insight into the relation between workers’ formal
employment contract (the wage, financial incentives) and social interaction
between managers and workers at the workplace. Further, we investigate
the consequences of social interaction and workers’ reciprocity for optimal
organizational design.
We focus on a situation where multiple principals compete for the effort
of an agent with reciprocal feelings. The game consists of three stages.
In the first stage, the principals (or the superior of the principals) design
a contract that specifies the relationship between each principal and the
agent. In addition, in this first stage the principals decide on whether and,
if so, with how many of them to share an agent. For example, we may
think of professors (or the department chair) deciding on with how many to
share one secretary, how effort by this secretary is rewarded financially, and
possibly how they treat the secretary while on the job (buying flowers on
her birthday). In the second stage, each principal decides on his ‘attention
level’ for the agent, taking into account that in the third stage the agent
responds positively to attention by providing more effort for him. In the
third stage, the agent decides on her effort level for each of the principals,
taking account of her contract and the attention provided by the principals
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in the second stage.
In the first-best — effort and attention are contractible — the marginal
benefits from effort for each principal equal the marginal costs of effort
for the agent minus a reciprocity discount. Further, when designing the
contract, the principals trade off the costs of giving attention against the
wage compensation that is necessary to attract or retain the agent. In the
optimum, the marginal cost of giving attention of each principal equal the
marginal utility that the agent derives from attention. Lastly, the optimal
number of principals that share an agent equates the average costs of effort
to the marginal costs of effort.
Certainly, effort and bilateral social interaction may not be contracted
upon, for instance because enforcement costs are high (effort) or because
the outcomes can not be verified by a third party (attention). We show
that when attention by managers can not be contracted, but the agent’s
effort is verifiable, the first-best outcome can still be achieved. With bonus
pay for the agent, attention of each principal can be inferred from the ef-
fort of the agent for each of them. Hence, in the first stage of the game,
the principals can contract to punish those among them for which effort
is too low, implicitly punishing ‘bad management’. By contrast, when the
agent’s effort is specified in a forcing contract that stipulates a fixed wage,
in the second stage principals have no incentive to provide a positive level
of attention. This moral-hazard problem is anticipated in the first stage
by the agent: she expects little attention from the principals and therefore
demands a high fixed wage. We thus identify a new benefit of granting
flexibility to workers: it enables the organization to measure and reward
managers’ performance.
A similar moral-hazard problem in attention provision exists when nei-
ther effort nor attention are contractible. However, due to an externality
problem, we show that an ‘attention race’ among the principals arises, which
mitigates or even reverses the underprovision of attention. The reason for
the attention race is that in a non-cooperative setting each principal has an
incentive to sway the agent’s effort his way. This incentive is stronger for a
larger number of principals and the more reciprocal the worker is.
Whether the attention race on balance is good or bad for the firm de-
pends on the preferences of the agent for attention. If the worker cares much
for attention, then the attention race is beneficial for the firm, for it creates a
positive working environment that is much appreciated by the agent. With-
out the attention race, the principals’ inability to commit to attention would
be very costly. The reverse happens when the worker puts a low value on
attention. In that case the attention race is costly to the firm, for it has
2
little effect on the participation constraint of the worker. Consequently, the
firm may want to limit the number of principals that share an agent.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
provides some further empirical motivation and briefly discusses related lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4, 5, and 6 examine the first-
best, the case of noncontractible attention, and the case of noncontractible
attention and effort, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical motivation and related literature
While the economic analysis of workers’ reciprocity has so far been mainly
confined to the role of the formal employment relation (the wage contract) in
triggering reciprocity and loyalty, in other fields there is scepticism towards
such overemphasis on pay as the motivator (see e.g. Pfeffer 1998).1 The
observation that social exchange provides non-financial incentives within
organizations has for long been recognized in the management literature
and in organizational sociology. Following a seminal paper in this field by
Gouldner (1960) — who argues that reciprocity is needed for the stability of
social systems, including the firm —, Blau (1964) distinguishes two types of
exchange in organizations: economic and social. Economic exchange typi-
cally is defined as formal ‘in-role’ behavior (the wage and contracted effort in
our model). Social exchange includes various ‘extra-role’ activities such as
giving attention in our model or providing non-specified effort for a partic-
ular manager. According to Blau (1964, p. 94) “only social exchange tends
to engender feelings of personal obligations, gratitude, and trust; purely
economic exchange as such does not”.
Empirical research provides substantial support for a performance en-
hancing effect of social exchange between managers and workers. For ex-
ample, using data from surveys among managers and workers, many studies
have found that a higher quality of so-called ‘leader-member exchange rela-
tionships’ (LMX) and ‘perceived supervisor support’ (PSS) are associated
1Reciprocity is only recently gaining prominence in organizational and managerial eco-
nomics. For example, in Prendergast’s (1999) review of incentive provision in firms, the
word reciprocity is not mentioned once. In a traditional economic model, a higher wage
only induces more effort if the wage is, in some or another way, linked to the worker’s
effort. By contrast, as argued by Akerlof (1982), when workers are reciprocal a more gen-
erous wage induces additional efforts, for a worker increases his utility by reciprocating
such a gift. While many laboratory studies provide support for this gift-exchange relation
(e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000), in a recent field experiment Gneezy and List (2006) find
only a temporary effect of high wages on effort.
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with better performance of the worker, both in required duties as well as in
those beyond the formal employment contract (see e.g. Settoon et al. 1996,
Wayne et al. 1997, Uhl-Bien and Maslyn 2003, Dabos and Rousseau 2004,
and Shanock and Eisenberger 2006).2 Nagin et al. (2002) study cheating
in call centers and find that employees who feel that they are treated well
by their employer cheat less and are less responsive to changes in monitor-
ing by the employer. Their data also show that many employees (70% in
their sample) have the impression that the company cares about their per-
sonal well-being. In line with this, US survey evidence indicates that many
managers are willing to listen to personal problems of their subordinates.3
Social exchange has also been shown to affect workers’ wage compensation.
A famous example is given by Gittell (2003) who evaluates pay conditions at
Southwest Airlines and finds that the positive corporate culture and strong
relational contracts make employees willing to accept a lower wage than
their industry counterparts. A number of examples from other industries
are provided in Pfeffer (1998).
Our model incorporates these findings on how social exchange matters
for productivity and wage cost in the following two ways. First, social
exchange relaxes the participation constraint of the workers: attention by
their superiors makes workers feel good, which makes them willing to work
for a lower wage. Second, we model reciprocity by assuming that social
interaction with a superior reduces the costs of effort for that superior at
the margin, so that attention induces the employee to work harder for a
given wage schedule.4
Our paper builds on the common agency literature with moral hazard,
2A closely related and partially overlapping body of research examines the effects of
‘perceived organizational support’ (POS), that is, an employee’s belief about how much
the organization as a whole provides support to or cares about the worker. Generally,
empirical studies find strong effects of POS on commitment to the organization (loyalty,
turnover), but — in contrast to LMX and PSS — only weak effects on performance (see
Pazy and Ganzach 2006 and the references therein).
334% of workers state that their boss is “very much” willing to listen to their personal
problems. Only 11% report that their boss is not willing to listen at all. See the Wisconsin
Longitudinal Study, 2002-2003 Wave, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/wlsresearch/.
4We thus assume that reciprocating provides immediate utility for the worker. Such
emotional and expressive reactions that stem from the evolution of the human brain
are often stressed in psychology (see Frank 1988) where, in general, reciprocity is not
considered a cognitive process. Instead, by configuration, people can not help responding
to the impulse of reciprocating a gift. To illustrate this, a famous (and true) story of
how reciprocal emotions can be used is that of car salesman Joe Gerard, known as “the
greatest car salesman”. His secret was to write each of his 13,000 former customers a card
every month with only the words “I like you” on it.
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initiated by Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986).5 The ‘attention race’
among principals that we identify in Section 6 echoes Bernheim and Whin-
ston’s (1986) result that inefficiencies may arise from coordination problems
between principals when coordination among principals would not achieve
the first-best.6 Our results on the optimal number of principals that share
an agent are close in spirit to Bernheim and Whinston (1985). They an-
alyze manufacturer’s incentives to share a marketing agent, which serves
as a facilitating device for product market collusion among manufacturers
(see also Gal-Or 1991 and Martimort 1996, among others). An important
difference between our set-up and the standard common-agency model is
that principals in our model have two instruments at their disposal to mo-
tivate the agent: contracts and attention. Another distinguishing feature
of our analysis is that we allow for two-sided moral hazard in the relation
between the agent and the principals: after contracts have been signed, both
the agent and the principals take actions that are imperfectly contractible.
One of the results emanating from this is that the attention race among
principals may be a blessing in disguise, for it may resolve a moral hazard
problem on the side of the principals. Lastly, we depart from the existing
literature on common agency by focusing on social exchange and reciprocity
in organizations.
3 The model
Our model revolves around homogenous principals, indexed by i, whose
payoffs depend on the services provided for them by one or more homogenous
agents. Agents are available in unlimited supply, but must be compensated
for foregoing their outside option (U > 0) and for the (net) disutility from
working. A principal can hire his own agent, but he can also decide to share
an agent with other principals (that is, to hire a common agent together
with other principals).7 Since principals are homogenous, they have identical
preferences over the number of principals to share an agent with; this number
5There is also a large literature on common agency with adverse selection, see Laffont
and Martimort (1997) and Martimort (2006) for surveys.
6See Dixit (1997) for an interesting analysis of common agency problems and incen-
tive provision in public organizations. Tirole (1988) and Holmstrom (1999) also discuss
common agency problems within organizations.
7None of the results change when a superior of the principals makes these decisions,
provided that the superior’s and joint principals’ interests are the same.
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is denoted by n.8 Each group of n principals collectively offers a contract
to an agent which specifies the agent’s wage compensation, w , as well as
the way in which wage costs are shared among the principals. If the agent’s
effort and/or the principals’ attention are contractible, the contract can
also contain other provisions, e.g. bonus pay to the agent depending on
her effort or discounts on a principal’s contribution to the agent’s wage
costs depending on the attention provided. After signing the contract, each
principal i independently chooses the level of attention he gives to the agent,
which we denote by ai. Subsequently, the agent chooses the level of effort she
exerts for each of the principals involved in the contract; effort for principal
i is denoted by ei.
The payoff of principal i is described by
πi = Q(ei)−H(ai)− si, (1)
where Q(ei) is a strictly concave and increasing function reflecting the value
for the principal of the agent’s effort for him, H(ai) is a strictly convex and
increasing function representing the principal’s costs of giving attention, and
si is the contribution of principal i to the agent’s wage compensation, w.9
The function Q(ei) satisfies the Inada conditions and the function H(ai)
satisfies H(0) = Ha(0) = 0, where (throughout the paper) subscripts of
functions denote partial derivatives. The budget constraint for the set of n
principals is
R n
0 si = w.
The agent’s payoff U is:
U = w − C(
R n
0 ei) +
R n
0 F (ei, ai). (2)
Since the wage enters linearly in the payoff function, the agent is risk-neutral
in income. The function C represents the agent’s cost of effort and is strictly
convex and increasing in the total effort exerted for all principals. It satisfies
C(0) = 0 and Ce(0) = 0. The function F (ai, ei) describes both the value of
attention to the agent and her reciprocity. It has properties Fei > 0 when
ai > 0 (the agent is reciprocal), Feiai > 0 (the willingness to reciprocate
effort to principal i increases with the attention given by principal i), and
8We will abstract from the problem that may be relevant in relatively small organiza-
tions that not all of the existing principals may find sufficiently many other principals to
optimally share an agent with. Also, for ease of exposition and without significant loss
of generality, when determining the optimal level of n, we will treat n as a continuous
variable.
9 It should be noted that, since a prinicpal’s ‘output’ Q depends only on the agent’s
effort for him, contractibility of the principal’s output and contractibility of the agent’s
effort yield identical results.
6
Fai > 0 (the agent enjoys attention). Further, we assume that Faa < 0 and
Fee < 0, so as to rule out corner solutions where infinite or zero attention
is optimal or where the agent exerts effort for only one of the principals.
Throughout the paper, the third derivatives of all functions are assumed to
be negligibly small. The participation constraint of the agent is:
w −C(
R n
0 ei) +
R n
0 F (ei, ai) ≥ U. (3)
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, the principals cooper-
atively decide on the number of principals that shares one agent and on the
content of the contract. The agent decides whether to accept or reject the
contract. Once the organizational structure and the contract are in place,
in stage two each principal independently chooses the level of attention he
gives to the agent. In stage 3 the agent chooses her effort level for each
principal.
4 Complete contracts
We start by considering the first-best case where both effort of the agent and
attention of the principals are contractible. The first-best contract stipulates
the levels of effort, attention, the number of principals that share an agent,
the agent’s wage, and the way wage costs are shared by the principals. Our
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the first-best:
1. the marginal benefit from effort for each principal equals the marginal
cost of effort for the agent minus a reciprocity discount: Qe(ei) =
Ce(
R n
0 ei)− Fe(ei, ai),
2. the marginal cost of attention for each principal equals the marginal
benefit of attention for the agent: Ha(ai) = Fa(ei, ai),
3. the optimal number of principals that share one agent equates the aver-
age cost of effort to the marginal cost of effort:
£
U +C(
R n
0 ei)
¤
/nei =
Ce(
R n
0 ei).
The proof is given in the appendix. Clearly, from the first part of the
proposition it follows that if the optimal level of attention is positive, then
for a given number of principals the first-best contract specifies an effort level
ei that is higher than the conventional level which ignores reciprocity (i.e.,
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ignores the term Fe > 0). The intuition is that the principals’ attention
reduces the agent’s marginal cost of effort because she feels the need to
reciprocate. This reduction in marginal cost raises the optimal level of effort
the agent exerts for each principal.
The second part of the proposition describes the optimal levels of atten-
tion. This involves a trade-off between the costs of giving attention for the
principals and the benefit from attention for the agent, where the optimal
level equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit. Obviously, in our set-
up the benefits from attention ultimately accrue to the principals, as the
agent’s wage compensation is such that her participation constraint binds.
The third part of the proposition shows that the optimal number of
principals that share one agent equates the agent’s average cost of effort to
the agent’s marginal cost of effort. This makes sense: sharing an agent with
more principals reduces each principal’s contribution to the fixed cost of
the agent (the agent’s compensation for foregoing her outside option utility
U), but increases the agent’s compensation for effort costs because these
are convex. As usual, the lowest cost per unit of effort is attained when
marginal cost equal average cost.
Note that the agent’s reciprocity has no direct effect on the optimal
number of principals. This follows from the separability of each principal’s
attention in the agent’s utility function, implying that the rents from giv-
ing attention are constant per principal.10 However, the optimal number
of principals sharing an agent is indirectly affected by reciprocity through
its effect on the optimal level of effort. This is described in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 In the first-best, the agent’s reciprocity makes it optimal for
the principals to commit to give attention to the agent, which increases op-
timal effort for each principal and, therefore, reduces the optimal number of
principals that share one agent.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition is as follows. As we have seen,
when the agent is reciprocal, principals optimally give attention, which raises
the agent’s effort for each of them. Consequently, the marginal cost of effort
(Ce) increase and so sharing an agent with more principals becomes more
costly. The resulting decline in the number of principals further increases
the optimal effort the agent exerts for each principal, as can been seen from
the first part of Proposition 1.
10An alternative assumption would be that the agent’s utility from a principal’s atten-
tion decreases with total attention received from all principals, i.e. Fai
Un
0 ai
< 0. Clearly,
this modification would reduce the optimal number of principals who share one agent.
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5 Incomplete contracts: unverifiable attention
Consider next a setting where the agent’s effort is verifiable, but attention
by the principals is not. As we will see, the first-best can be achieved even
though attention cannot be verified. This is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 If effort is contractible and attention is not contractible,
then the first-best can be achieved by offering an incentive contract that pays
the agent the full marginal product of her effort for each principal and that
conditions each principal’s contribution to the agent’s wage on the effort
provided for him.
We prove the proposition by backward induction, and so start with the
agent’s effort choice in stage 3 of the game. Let the agent’s wage consist of
a base salary, w, and a set of n bonuses with each bonus b(ei) depending on
the effort for one of the principals involved in the contract. The first-order
conditions for the agent’s optimal efforts then are:
be(ei)− Ce(
R n
0 ei) + Fe(ei, ai) = 0 for all i. (4)
Comparing to the first-best level of effort as described in Proposition 1, it
follows that if the agent is shared by the first-best number of principals and
principals have given the first-best level of attention in the second stage of
the game, then be(ei) = Qe(ei) for all ei ensures that the agent provides
first-best effort for all principals. So, we have the standard result that,
when both principals and agents are risk-neutral in income, optimal bonus
pay equals the full marginal product.
Next consider the principals’ choice of attention in the second stage of the
game. Let each principal’s contribution to the agent’s wage costs depend on
the effort provided for him and take the following form: s(ei) = b(ei)+ t(ei).
Thus, each principal covers the agent’s bonus pay arising from the agent’s
effort for him and makes an additional contribution to or receives a discount
from the organization, t(ei), which also depends on the agent’s effort for
him. The first-order condition for principal i’s optimal attention then is:
dei
dai
[Qe(ei)− be(ei)− te(ei)]−Ha(ai) = 0, (5)
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where, by totally differentiating (4), the effect of attention on effort is given
by:11
dei
dai
=
−Fea [bee + Fee − (n− 1)Cee]
(bee + Fee)2 − nCee (bee + Fee)
> 0, (6)
where the sign follows from our assumptions about the functions F and C
as described in Section 3 and from bee = Qee < 0, which is implied by
the result that the agent receives the full marginal product of effort, as
shown in the previous step of this proof. Equation (6) shows that when the
agent is reciprocal, the agent exerts more effort for a principal when the
principal has given more attention (that is, if Fea > 0, then dei/dai > 0).
This positive effect of attention on effort can give principals an incentive
to provide attention, as described by first-order condition (5). Note that,
since the agent receives her full marginal product (be(ei) = Qe(ei)), the first
two terms in square brackets in (5) cancel out. This bears an important
message: paying a high bonus for effort to the agent implies weak incentives
for principals to give attention. The intuition for this result is that a higher
bonus means that more of the returns to effort translate into higher agent’s
pay rather than into a higher payoff for the principal. Hence, principals have
less to gain from increasing the agent’s effort by giving attention.
In order to induce the first-best level of attention, the principals need
to be incentivized through the other part of the contribution scheme, t(ei).
Comparing (5) to the condition for first-best attention as described in Propo-
sition 1, and denoting the first-best levels of attention and effort by a∗ and
e∗ respectively, it follows that if
te(ei) = −
µ
dei
dai
¶−1
Fa(a∗, e∗)
for all ei, then each principal has an incentive to provide the first-best level
of attention.12 Since dei/dai > 0 and Fa > 0, the optimal te is negative
and so principals receive a discount on their contribution to wage costs,
which increases with the effort provided for them. This way, principals fully
internalize the positive effects of their attention on the agent’s payoff.13
11Note that (4) represents n first-order conditions describing optimal effort for all n
principals. Expression (6) follows from differentiating all these first-order conditions to ai,
ei, and all ej 6=i, and then combining them so as to end up with an expression for dei/dai.
Since the third derivatives of all functions are assumed to be negligibly small, we have
suppressed the arguments of all functions in (6).
12Note that dei/dai is independent of effort and attention by our assumption about the
third derivatives.
13First-best attention can also be achieved by a forcing contract for the principals which
punishes those principals for whom effort deviates from the first-best. An advantage of
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Lastly, since first-best effort and first-best attention can be sustained,
the optimal number of principals that share an agent is also equal to its
first-best level. The base salary of the agent is such that her participation
constraint binds:
w = U + C(
R n
0 e
∗)−
R n
0 F (e
∗, a∗)− nb(e∗),
and the lump-sum part of the principals’ contributions must be such that
their budget constraint binds:
ns(e∗) = nb(e∗) + nt(e∗) = w + nb(e∗)⇒ nt(e∗) = w.
Summarizing, the noncontractibility of attention does neither affect the
players’ payoffs nor organizational design. However, it has important con-
sequences for the optimal design of the contract. While in the previous
section a simple forcing contract stipulating the agent’s effort and the prin-
cipals’ attention was sufficient to attain the first-best, with noncontractible
attention incentives need to be fine-tuned. First, the agent must be offered
flexibility in effort choice rather than face binding effort constraints. Sup-
pose the agent’s contract would dictate her effort level, as in the previous
section. Then, principals would have no incentive to give attention, since
the agent’s effort would be unresponsive to social exchange.14 Anticipating
this lack of attention, the agent would then demand a higher wage for the
same (or a lower) level of effort. Second, to avoid underprovision of effort,
the organization can not rely on social exchange alone. To attain first-best
effort, the agent must be offered incentive pay equal to the full marginal
product of her effort. Third, principals must be given financial incentives to
give attention. Even though attention can not be directly rewarded, princi-
pals can be induced to give sufficient attention by making their contribution
to the wage costs dependent on the agent’s effort for him. This way, ‘bad
management’ by principals is implicitly punished and ‘good management’ is
implicitly rewarded. Last, we have found that higher performance pay for
the agent strengthens the agent’s incentives to exert effort but weakens the
principals’ incentives to give attention, because principals have less to gain
from higher effort when agents keep more of the fruits of their effort. To
the incentive contract studied in the main text is that it better insulates principals from
trembling hands of their colleagues, the agent, and themselves.
14A related argument is given by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) in the context of a
dynamic model without social exchange. They show that, when an employee’s effort is
not fully contractible, the employer has an incentive to leave some of his (potentially
contractible) obligations ambiguous, so as to strengthen repeated game incentives.
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keep principals motivated to provide attention to the agent, they must be
sufficiently rewarded by the organization (the group of principals or their
superior) when the agent works hard for them.
6 Incomplete contracts: unverifiable effort and at-
tention
When neither effort nor attention are contractible, the contract only stipu-
lates the number of principals the agent will work for and her base salary,
which is equally shared by the principals. We solve the game by backward
induction.
In the third stage, the agent chooses effort for each principal to maximize
her payoff (2). The first-order conditions are:
−Ce(
R n
0 ei) + Fe(ei, ai) = 0 for all i. (7)
Notice that, in general, we cannot say whether effort is higher or lower than
in the first-best case. While the agent has neither a contractual obligation
(Section 4) nor a financial incentive (Section 5) to provide effort, the princi-
pals may give more attention or share the agent with fewer principals than
in the first-best as substitutes for the lack of formal incentives. For later
use, we derive some comparative static results for the agent’s choice of effort,
which are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If neither effort nor attention are contractible, then:
1. for a given level of attention by each principal, effort for each principal
decreases with the number of principals that share an agent (holding
ai constant, dei/dn < 0);
2. for a given number of principals that share an agent, attention by prin-
cipal i increases the agent’s effort for principal i, decreases the agent’s
effort for all other principals, and increases the agent’s total effort
(holding n constant, dei/dai > 0, dej 6=i/dai < 0, and d
R n
0 ei/dai > 0);
3. the effect of principal i’s attention on the agent’s effort for him in-
creases with the number of principals that share an agent (d (dei/dai) /dn >
0).
The proof is in the appendix, the intuition follows. First, for a given
level of attention, working for more principals reduces effort for each prin-
cipal, because the accompanying increase in total effort raises the agent’s
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marginal cost of effort for each principal. Second, when a principal gives
more attention to the agent, the agent feels a need to reciprocate and so
provides more effort for him. As this raises her marginal cost of effort, she
provides less effort for the other principals. Hence, attention by a principal
imposes a negative externality on other principals. Third, the effectiveness
at the margin of a principal’s attention in raising the agent’s effort for him
increases with the number of principals. The intuition is as follows. When
a principal gives more attention, the agent reciprocates by increasing effort
for that principal, which comes partly at the cost of increasing total effort,
and partly at the cost of reducing effort for the other principals. When the
agent works for more principals, the latter cost is lower, because a given re-
duction in effort for the other principals can be spread over a larger number
of principals. This implies that the agent is more responsive to a principal’s
attention as the number of principals increases.
In the second stage principals independently choose their level of atten-
tion. The first-order condition for optimal attention of principal i is:
dei
dai
Qe(ei)−Ha(ai) = 0. (8)
Each principal trades off the cost of giving attention and the benefit that
the agent exerts more effort for him. Note the difference with attention in
the first-best case described by Proposition 1: when effort and attention are
noncontractible, the provision of attention depends on the responsiveness of
the agent to attention and not on how valuable attention is to the agent. As
we will see, this may result in too high or too low attention compared to the
first-best. Note also that each principal disregards the effect of his attention
on the efforts provided by the agent for the other principals. As Lemma 1
showed, if principal i gives more attention, the agent responds by increasing
effort for principal i and decreasing effort for the other (n − 1) principals.
This, in turn, induces these other principals to give more attention to the
agent as well, because the decrease in effort makes additional efforts more
valuable. In equilibrium, the negative externality that principals impose on
one another makes that each principal’s attention is above the level that is
in their joint interest during the second stage of the game.15
15The principals’ joint surplus maximizing level of attention in the second stage is
described by:
dei
dai
Qe(ei) + (n− 1)
dej 6=i
dai
Qe(ej 6=i)−Ha(ai) = 0 for all i.
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The following lemma describes the effect on attention of the number of
principals that share an agent.
Lemma 2 If neither effort nor attention are contractible, then an increase
in the number of principals that share an agent increases each principal’s
attention (dai/dn > 0).
The proof is in the appendix. Increasing the number of principals has
two effects working in the same direction. First, for a given level of at-
tention, the agent exerts less effort for each principal when the number of
principals increases. Since the marginal product of effort is decreasing in ef-
fort, additional effort becomes more valuable to each principal. Hence, each
principal increases attention so as to increase effort for him. Second, when
the number of principals increases, the agent becomes more responsive to a
principal’s attention (as we have seen in Lemma 1), and so each principal
has a stronger incentive to provide attention.
Lastly, in the first stage the principals decide on the number of principals
to share an agent with, taking into account the effects on attention and effort
we derived above as well as the effect on the wage costs. As in the first-best,
the wage costs are equally shared among the homogenous principals. The
following proposition describes the optimal number of principals that share
an agent when neither effort nor attention are contractible and reiterates
the levels of effort and attention that arise.
Proposition 3 If neither effort nor attention are contractible, then:
1. the agent’s effort is described by −Ce(
R n
0 ei) + Fe(ei, ai) = 0 for all i,
2. the principal’s attention is given by deidaiQe(ei)−Ha(ai) = 0 for all i,
3. the number of principals that share an agent is described by:
1
n2
£
U + C(
R n
0 ei)
¤
− 1
n
eiCe(
R n
0 ei)−
dai
dn
[Ha(ai)− Fa(ei, ai)] = 0. (9)
The proof is in the appendix. As in the first-best case described in
Proposition 1, the first two terms in (9) show that principals strive to min-
imize the costs of the agent’s services by setting the number of principals
that share an agent such that the agent’s average and marginal cost of effort
are equal. Importantly, the level of n where the first two terms in (9) are
zero need not coincide with the first-best level of n. The reason is that the
level of effort will generally be different in the two cases, see the first parts
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of Propositions 1 and 3. When effort is lower than in the first-best (because
the lack of financial incentives is not made up for by increased attention),
principals have an incentive to share an agent with more principals than in
the first-best case, because sharing an agent is less costly when the agent
provides lower effort for each principal. When effort is higher than in the
first-best (when the attention race is severe, inducing high effort for each
principal), the reverse is true: principals have an incentive to share an agent
with fewer principals.
The third term in (9) describes the effect of the number of principals that
share an agent on the principal’s payoff through its effect on attention provi-
sion. Note that the terms in brackets sum to zero when both attention and
effort are at their first-best level. However, principals’ attention will likely
not match with the first-best level because, as we have seen, the motives for
giving attention differ between the two cases (compare the second parts of
Propositions 1 and 3). While in the first-best case attention is set so as to
maximize the agent’s and principals’ joint surplus from attention provision,
in the case of noncontractibility, attention is chosen noncooperatively and
only given to evoke reciprocal feelings in the agent. If the resulting attention
is low so that Fa exceeds Ha (e.g., because the agent values attention a lot
but the agent’s effort is only weakly responsive to attention), then the third
term in (9) is positive and so principals have an incentive to increase the
number of principals that share an agent. By doing so, they make the atten-
tion race more severe, which is a blessing, since it mitigates the principals’
underprovision of attention. Conversely, if attention is high so that Fa is
lower than Ha (e.g. because the attention race is severe, while attention is
not valued that much by the agent), the third term in (9) is negative and so
principals have an incentive to limit the number of principals that share an
agent so as to reduce wasteful attention provision.
7 Conclusion
This paper has explored social interaction in the workplace between man-
agers and workers. We have investigated the conditions under which in-
efficient social exchange in organization can occur, and how this may be
avoided. We have used a common agency setting to allow for multiple post-
hiring loyalties in organizations on top of the formal employment contract.
We think that such a setting captures the essences of life in the modern
firm, for many employees effectively work to satisfy the demands of more
than one superior. On top of the examples of employees in support de-
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partments mentioned in the introduction, we may add the many employees
in matrix organizations (who report to a functional manager as well as to
a project manager), internal service managers (who provide an interface
between parts of the organization), and procurement managers (who coor-
dinate and communicate the requests of various branches of the organization
towards external suppliers).
Our paper is just one piece in a growing body of literature on behav-
ioral personnel economics that stresses the importance of feelings in the
workplace. Classic early examples are the papers by Rotemberg (1994) on
altruism among workers and Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) on the role of
emphatic managers in alleviating the hold-up problem. In Rob and Zemsky
(2002) workers derive social utility from cooperative tasks that have no mon-
etary rewards. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) discuss the implications of social
identity at work. Delfgaauw and Dur (2005) and Francois (2006) consider
how monetary rewards affect the sorting of motivated workers into firms.
In addition, there is a growing literature that studies manager-subordinate
interaction in the post-hiring phase. For example, using a model with im-
perfect information and a single principal, Benabou and Tirole (2003) and
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2006) discuss how task assignment and pay
structure may reveal the manager’s private judgement of the worker’s ability
or his beliefs about the abilities of workers in general. The communication
of these beliefs in turn affects the worker’s motivation. In our view, these
papers have considerably increased our understanding of human relations in
the workplace.
We have taken a noncognitive approach to modeling reciprocity. The
economic literature offers two alternative ways to model reciprocal behav-
ior. First, the intention-based approach stresses motives rather than actions
(Rabin 1993, Falk and Fischbacher 2006). A recent application of this view
to manager-worker relations is Arbak and Kranich (2005) who derive condi-
tions under which a high wage offer is informative about the employer’s true
intentions. A similar reasoning may hold for manager’s attention-giving.
Second, agents may reciprocate out of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Englmaier and Wambach (2005) and
Fehr et al. (2006) study optimal contract design when agents care for the
relative payoff. Our treatment of reciprocity need not conflict with this ap-
proach, except when the wealth of the principal and the agent are far apart.
Recently, Maximiano et al. (2006a, 2006b) show in experiments that agents
reciprocate to a generous wage, irrespective of the number of agents the
principal employs and also irrespective of whether the principal is residual
claimant.
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What should managers take away from our paper? First, granting more
flexibility to employees in their choice of effort makes it easier for organiza-
tions to measure and reward the performance of middle managers. When
employees are easily motivated by these managers, then the organization
gets hold of a powerful set of motivational practices. Second, we have seen
that increasing performance pay for workers should be complemented by
stronger incentives for managers to support their subordinates. Third, one
should be cautious with sharing human resources, for it results in rivalry
among managers, absorbing precious corporate energy. Hence, in addition
to worrying about underprovision of support by managers, executives should
also be concerned about limiting excessive influence activities by managers
in the workplace.16 Last, selecting and recruiting employees on assumed
reciprocity, flexibility and loyalty can have its cost, as it induces managers
higher on the corporate ladder to devote too much time and energy to social
exchange.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
With verifiable effort and attention, principals design a forcing contract,
specifying both the effort exerted by the agent for each principal, and the
attention given by each principal to the agent. Since principals are homoge-
nous and we have decreasing returns to scale in production and convex cost
of effort and attention, we can safely assume that the first-best contract has
effort and attention being the same for all principals,17 and that the wage
of the agent is shared equally among the n principals that share the agent:
si =
w
n
.
Using this and the principal’s payoff function (1), the first-best optimal levels
of effort, attention, and number of principals who share an agent solves:
max
ai, ei, n
Q(ei)−H(ai)−
1
n
£
U + C(
R n
0 ei)−
R n
0 F (ei, ai)
¤
,
16A similar concern can apply to post-hiring influence activities by workers, see Milgrom
(1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Fairburn and Malcomson (2001), and Inderst et al.
(2005) for insightful analyses.
17Alternatively, we can proceed in two steps. First, for a given n, determine the jointly
optimal levels of ei and ai for all i, where ei and ai are allowed to be different across
principals. By our assumptions about the shape of the functions Q, H, and F , we find
that optimal ei and ai are the same for all i. Second, using these results, determine the
optimal n from the perspective of an individual principal. The results are the same.
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where ai and ei are restricted to be the same for all i and the term in brackets
is the agent’s wage which follows from the agent’s participation constraint
(3). The first-order conditions are:
Qe(ei)− Ce(
R n
0 ei) + Fe(ei, ai) = 0 for all i, (A1)
−Ha(ai) + Fa(ei, ai) = 0 for all i, (A2)
1
n2
£
U +C(
R n
0 ei)−
R n
0 F (ei, ai)
¤
− 1
n
£
eiCe(
R n
0 ei)− F (ei, ai)
¤
= 0. (A3)
The conditions (A1) and (A2) are identical to those in the first and second
part of Proposition 1. Since optimal effort and attention are the same for
all i, condition (A3) can be simplified to:
1
nei
£
U + C(
R n
0 ei)
¤
= Ce(
R n
0 ei), (A4)
which is identical to the condition in the third part of Proposition 1.¤
Proof of Corollary 1
For convenience, we introduce a weight, γ, on the term
R n
0 F (ei, ai) in the
agent’s utility function (2). Differentiating the adapted first-order conditions
to ei, ai, n, and γ and solving the differential equations gives:
dei
dγ
=
− (Haa − γFaa) γFe − γ2FeaFa
(Qee + γFee) (Haa − γFaa) + γ2FeaFae
> 0,
dai
dγ
=
1
(Haa − γFaa)
µ
γFae
dei
dγ
+ γFa
¶
> 0,
dn
dγ
= −n
e
dei
dγ
< 0,
where we have suppressed the arguments of all functions for brevity, and
the denominator of dei/dγ is negative by the second-order conditions.¤
Proof of Lemma 1
Note that (7) represents n first-order conditions describing optimal effort
for all n principals. Applying the implicit function theorem gives:
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dei
dn
=
eiCee
Fee − nCee
< 0,
dei
dai
=
−Fea [Fee − (n− 1)Cee]
F 2ee − nCeeFee
> 0,
dej 6=i
dai
=
−FeaCee
F 2ee − nCeeFee
< 0,
d
R n
0 ei
dai
=
dei
dai
+ (n− 1)dej 6=i
dai
=
−Fea
Fee − nCee
> 0,
d (dei/dai)
dn
=
−FeaFeeC2ee
(F 2ee − nCeeFee)2
> 0,
where the signs follow from our assumptions about the functions F and C
as described in Section 3.¤
Proof of Lemma 2
Applying the implicit function theorem to (8), while treating ei as an
endogenous variable and noting that dei/dai depends on n but not on any
of the other endogenous variables (see the proof of Lemma 1 and recall that
all third derivatives are negligibly small), gives:
dai
dn
=
1
Haa
∙
d (dei/dai)
dn
Qe +
dei
dn
Qee
¸
=
1
Haa
µ
−FeaFeeC2eeQe
(F 2ee − nCeeFee)2
+
eiCeeQee
Fee − nCee
¶
> 0.
¤
Proof of Proposition 3
The proofs to the first and second part of Proposition 3 are given in the
main text preceding the proposition. The third part describes the optimal
number of principals that share an agent, which follows from:
max
n
Q(ei)−H(ai)−
1
n
£
U + C(
R n
0 ei)−
R n
0 F (ei, ai)
¤
.
resulting in the first-order condition:
1
n2
£
U + C(
R n
0 ei)−
R n
0 F (ei, ai)
¤
− 1
n
£
eiCe(
R n
0 ei)− F (ei, ai)
¤
+
+
dai
dn
½
−Ha(ai) + Fa(ei, ai) +
dei
dai
£
Qe(ei)− Ce(
R n
0 ei) + Fe(ei, ai)
¤¾
+
+
dei
dn
£
Qe(ei)− Ce(
R n
0 ei) + Fe(ei, ai)
¤
. (10)
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Using the first-order conditions (7) and (8) and noting that ai and ei are
identical for all i, the condition can be simplified to the expression in Propo-
sition 3.¤
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